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Abstract:
The liver transplant waiting list is designed to allocate livers to the sickest patients first.
Before March 1 st , 2002 livers were allocated to patients based on objective clinical indicators and subjective factors. In particular a center placing a prospective transplant recipient in the ICU lead to a higher position on the liver transplant waiting list. After March 1 st , 2002 a policy reform mandated that priority on the liver transplant waiting list no longer be influenced by whether the patient was in the ICU. I show that after the reform ICU usage declined most precipitously in areas with multiple transplant centers. I find no evidence that pervasive manipulation in the most crowded liver transplant markets distorted the allocation of livers away from the intended prioritization of the sickest patients first. It appears that centers in areas with multiple competitors manipulated the waiting list to ensure the sickest patients received a liver.
Introduction 1
It is well known that competition can lead to many socially desirable outcomes such as lower prices, higher productivity, and less deadweight loss. While often socially beneficial, competition can also spawn unethical strategic choices that harm many of a firm's stakeholders and the greater public welfare (Staw and Szwajkowski, 1975; Shleifer, 2004) .
Business stealing, predatory pricing, sabotage, and dishonesty can spread across firms as strategic responses to increased competition. These responses may yield private benefit to the firm at the expense of other stakeholders.
A key mechanism that drives the relationship between competition and unethical firm strategies is that firms are unable to commit to ethical behavior. In many interactions, if all firms could commit to eschew unethical strategies then collectively they would be better off. However, if all of the other firms are behaving ethically then there are enormous incentives for any one firm to behave unethically. This generates a race to the bottom where the lack of commitment that leads many of firms to behave unethically oftentimes leaves all of them collectively worse off.
Uncovering evidence of ethically dubious strategies is quite difficult because these practices are usually hidden under a veil of secrecy. Firms intentionally hide unethical practices from public view to avoid legal and market-based sanctions of their strategic behavior. To study the impact of competition on unethical behavior I use a focused empirical study of the liver transplant market that uses particularly rich data, substantial variation in competition, and a shift in policy to overcome many of the hurdles in studying the relationship between of competition on unethical firm behavior.
Approximately 6,000 transplants are performed annually and, on average, 2,500 people die while waiting for a liver. Using the policy change to examine changes in ICU admission behavior, I find that after the policy changed the use of the ICU decreased more in markets with more firms. I also find that after the policy changed the percentage of relatively healthy people in the ICU decreased most in the OPOs with more firms. This suggests that the threshold sickness level for admitting a patient to the ICU increases most dramatically after the policy reform in the OPOs with more firms. While this overly aggressive use of the ICU was certainly costly in and of itself it is unclear whether this distorted the allocation of livers to patients. I find no evidence that after the policy change patients were sicker at the time of transplant in markets where multiple centers compete. This suggests that the strategic use of the ICU by centers competing with each other was offsetting. It appears that each competing center used the ICU to move their sickest patients to the top of the list and had a negligible overall impact on the rank ordering of patients waiting for a liver. While certain specifications are not always significant, overall the consistency of the results highlights an association between competitive pressures and the gaming of the transplant system. This paper proceeds as follows: Section II reviews the relevant literature. Section III describes the relevant institutions and some qualitative evidence. Section IV develops the hypotheses. Section V discusses the identification strategy and summarizes the sample.
Section VI explains the empirical strategy. Section VII presents the results. Section VII concludes.
Prior Literature
There has been some prior literature on the impact of competition on ethical behavior.
3 Staw and Szwajkowski (1975) and Shleifer (2004) present a straightforward argument on how competition can increase unethical behavior. They define unethical behavior as "a behavior that is morally sanctioned by the larger community but can improve firm performance." Unethical behavior on the part of competitors forces the firm to behave unethically even if the firm places some value on ethical behavior.
4
There have been various approaches to the empirical study of the impact of competition on unethical behavior. Hegarty and Sims (1978) provide some of the first evidence linking competition to unethical behavior in the laboratory setting. They find a strong result indicating that competition increases unethical behavior, but the laboratory setting is of concern when trying to generalize the results. In contrast, in a survey of sales person behavior (Dubinsky and Ingram, 1984) find no significant evidence of competition influencing ethical behavior. It is difficult to take this work as definitive due to the difficulties that are pervasive in using surveys in this area. Cai et al., (2007) find a positive association between increases in competition and an increase in tax avoidance activity among Chinese manufacturers. This current paper is similar to Cai in that both empirical studies that show the importance of competition as an explanation of unethical behavior.
The current study is distinctive because many of the factors that suggest self-regulation can work are absent in Cai, et al.'s work on Chinese manufacturers.
There is a limited economics literature studying the impact of the opportunity to engage in business stealing practices on market entry. These papers demonstrate in a variety of settings that free entry can be inefficient when the entrant's business plan is to steal incumbent's business rather than generate new value.
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There are also sets of studies in the healthcare literature that look at the impact of incentives on ethical behavior. Dafny (2005) provides a useful framework for dividing this literature into two areas: nominal responses to incentives and real responses. The work on nominal responses focuses on how price changes in reimbursement rates provide incentives for hospitals to change their diagnosis. This behavior essentially redistributes wealth from the insurance providers to the hospital without providing additional services. Additionally many papers find that as the relative reimbursement rates for treatments change, hospitals respond by moving to more lucrative diagnoses (Carter et. al. ,1990; Dafny, 2005; Silverman and Skinner, 2004; and Psaty et. al., 1999). 6 This literature also studies how real responses, such as treatment choices, are affected by financial incentives. In an influential paper Gruber and Owings (1996) show that an increase in reimbursements for cesarean sections is associated with an increase in the number of cesarean sections performed by obstetricians. Cutler (1995) and Gilman (2000) additionally find evidence of a positive association between reimbursement rate and procedure intensity, as measured by length of stay or number of procedures performed.
However, the results are not ubiquitous. Dafny (2005) finds little evidence of increases in reimbursements leading to changes in length of stay, procedure volume, or survival rates.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, the ethical dilemma is much more intense in liver transplants than in other markets. Second, few of these studies look at the impact of competition on ethical behavior. 7 One could easily imagine that when the potential for harm is high a relatively small number of hospitals could find ways to cooperate so as to avoid giving a liver to a relatively healthy patient. Professional codes of ethics and not-for-profit organizational status are major factors that could push these centers to cooperate. This paper shows that even with a limited number of competitors and muted incentives, many centers act unethically.
Finally Scanlon et al. (2004) also has a study similar to mine looking at the association between competition and the gaming of the heart transplant market. They study a policy change in 1999 that made it more difficult to move patients to the top of the heart transplant waiting list. In the three years prior to 1999 they find a cross sectional association between the number of transplant centers in an OPO and the probability that a patient was listed in the most serve need category at time of transplant. After 1999 when listing a patient in the top priority became less subjective the cross sectional association between number of firms in the market and percentage of patients in the most serve need disappeared. Though their study of hearts is similar to my study of livers in the basic setup there are two crucial distinguishing factors in the current paper: (i) My paper uses individual clinical level data on how sick the patient was at the time of the transplant. This enables me to establish whether the aggressive use of the ICU influenced the final allocation of livers to patients. Because Scanlon et al. (2004) were using aggregate data they were not able to say anything about whether manipulation of patient status on the heart transplant waiting list actually influenced the final allocation of organs. Additionally I am able to show that manipulation was in fact used on sicker patients. (ii) I use monthly level data and a panel approach which allows me to control for a variety of confounding effects not addressed by Scanlon et al. (2004) . Using a richer set of controls, OPO specific time trends, and regional time varying fixed effects allows for a more convincing display that the observed changes in behavior are attributable to the policy change and not to heterogeneous OPO specific trends over time.
Institutional Background
In the United States the demand for liver transplants exceeds the supply of available livers. Figure 1 shows that the number of liver transplants has risen steadily to approximately 6,000 transplants per year. Figure 1 also shows there is still a significant gap, as more than 2,000 people die each year waiting for a liver. Occasionally part of a liver can be given from a living donor to a patient in need, but the risk associated with this procedure is high. Over 95% of all liver transplants come from deceased donors. severely sick patients for each liver while the 75th percentile OPO had a ratio of 2.53 severely sick patients for each liver. 11 Given the high stakes involved there would be strong incentives for a patient to move across the country to an area with less liver scarcity.
Intuitively two factors seem to limit sick patients from sorting across the country to compete away this variation: financial constraints and attachment to home hospitals. It is often difficult to move away from your home to wait for another liver. People who are in poor health often do not have the financial resources to re-locate across the country. Insurance may not cover procedures at hospitals located further away from your home. Finally some individuals may be unaware of these differences and or have other attachments to local health care providers.
The boundaries of the OPOs that limit national sharing of organs are maintained in part for political reasons; areas with a relatively good supply of organs are reticent to share them with other parts of the country. Within each OPO there are a variety of market structures; some OPOs only have one center that provides liver transplants, and others have multiple transplant centers. When a patient needs a liver, they join the waiting list that is specific to a particular center. While a patient can be listed at multiple centers for a liver transplant, during the sample period this occurred approximately 4% of the time. There are certain compatibility concerns based on blood type. The matching requirements tend to not be as severe as those for kidney transplants.
Centers have discretion in the organs that they accept. When a center decides whether to accept or decline an organ there are no hard guidelines. Centers make decisions on whether to accept a lower quality organ today based on the expected probability of receiving a higher quality organ sometime in the future (Howard 2002 & Alagoz et. al 2007 .
The conclusions of these models and from practice is that people who are very sick are more likely to receive a marginal organ since the cost of waiting is exceptionally high.
The goal of the allocation system since the mid-90s until today has been to prioritize the sickest individuals first. This is certainly not the only welfare criteria that could be used for allocation policy. 12 During the period of study the stated goals of the program did not change, but the ways in which the allocation scheme meant to implement those goals did.
Prior to March 1, 2002, livers were allocated on both objective and subjective criteria.
13
Priority was determined on the basis of a discrete aggregation of clinical scores 14 and waiting list time. Since the scoring system was not continuous this lead to many patients being clumped together in terms of priority. Time on the waiting list was used to distinguish between these patients and became one of the most important factors in determining who received a liver and who didn't. 15 The rules at the time stated that if a patient was in the ICU they would move up the list ahead of anyone who was not in the ICU. Being moved into the ICU meant being moved ahead of those who had been on the waiting list longer but were not in the ICU. Once in the ICU livers would then be allocated to patients based on a discrete aggregation of clinical scores and then on the basis of how long they have been in the ICU. Patients within an OPO had first priority, but there was a system in place to promote limited regional sharing. If there were no patients who required continuous medical care (either in the hospital or at a facility close to the hospital) then a liver would be moved outside of the OPO. This policy lead to about a fourth of the livers moving outside of their home OPO.
The system was criticized for creating numerous incentives and opportunities to manipulate who gets a liver. Centers could put potential patients on the waiting list years before they would actually need a liver so as to inflate their waiting time. Many of the subjective indicators could also be manipulated. For example, one of the subjective indicators transplant centers were required to measure was the severity of ascites, which is an accumulation of fluid in the abdomen. Without an invasive surgery measurement of this condition is subjective and left considerable discretion to the centers.
Crucially, putting someone in the ICU improved their priority status, even over those who had more time on the waiting list. There was some anecdotal evidence that ICU admission was being used strategically. The most salient case involved the University of Illinois' liver transplant program in the highly competitive Chicago liver transplant market.
It was claimed that "according to the Chicago Tribune, some of the patients [in the ICU] at the University of Illinois Medical Center spent weekends at home, one acted the part of a clown at a blood drive, and another was at a restaurant having dinner when he got word that a suitable liver had been located. Authorities alleged that one patient on the list was not even eligible for transplantation" (Murphy 2004) . 17 Centers could use the ICU strategically by admitting patients who were not critically ill so as to move them ahead on the list. The
University of Illinois was eventually fined two million dollars by Medicare for this abuse of the transplant system.
In response to these problems, the United Network for Organ Sharing completely After the policy change, waiting list time and ICU status were no longer considered in the allocation of livers. Priority was now based on clinical indicators that came from blood tests, which are markedly more difficult indicators to manipulate.
Empirical Tests
Using the logic of Staw & Szwajkowski (1975) and Shleifer (2004) I propose a simple framework for analyzing the impact of competition on strategic misrepresentation in the liver transplant market. Prior to the policy change within an OPO with multiple competitors it is sensible to believe that strategic use of the ICU by centers to move patients ahead on the list can be a rational outcome, absent the ability to commit to ethical strategies. If one center in an OPO decided not to engage in strategically using the ICU, that center would face the prospect of losing opportunities to perform liver transplants. More centers should lead to more competition. After the policy change the impact of competition on strategic use of the ICU should be eliminated. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: After the policy change, the rate of ICU usage should decrease more in OPOs with more centers.
A natural point of concern is that areas with more competitors may also have sicker patients on average. If the patients are sicker in more competitive areas then hypothesis 1 could be true without strategic manipulation. This can be addressed in a number of ways. Finally it is important to know whether distortions to the sickest first prioritization were more likely in OPOs with more firms. Consider a hypothetical OPO with two centers.
Suppose that both centers were equally aggressive in admitting their sickest patients to the ICU prior to the reform. The sickest patients would be moved into the ICU and consequentially to the top of the list. Though the ICU was being used excessively the sickest patients would still receive livers regardless of the attempt to manipulate the list. After the reform the ICU would be used less aggressively, relatively healthy patients would be kept out of the ICU, but the average level of sickness of patients at the time of transplant should unchanged. Empirically I would expect to observe that the change in the average patient's MELD scores at time of transplant induced by the policy reforms would not be influenced by the number of centers in an OPO. Alternatively if the centers were using the ICU to move relatively healthy people ahead of sicker people on the list I would expect the average level of sickness of patients at the time of transplant to increase after the reforms.
Data & Sample Selection
The data for this project comes from a comprehensive database on every liver transplant Another difficulty with the data was that there were many observations where the MELD score could not be computed because one of the three clinical indicators was missing. To address this problem I created predicted MELD scores at transplant when one or two of the clinical factors were missing. Though this is not desirable it provides a useful way to incorporate more than 98% of the data into the analysis. The remaining observations where no MELD score could be computed for a transplant recipient were dropped.
Empirical Strategy
I compare how the number of firms in an OPO influences the key outcome variables: ICU usage rates, average sickness at time of transplant, and percentage of healthy patients in the ICU, share of patients in the ICU. This comparison is done in two ways: in the cross section and through a difference in differences approach. In the cross section I look at how variation in the number of firms across markets impacts the outcomes before and after the policy change. A common objection to a cross sectional approach is that it (or they) omitted fixed characteristics at the OPO level drives the results. To address this concern I estimate how firms in competitive markets respond to the change in policy. If there was more strategic manipulation of the list in markets with more firms, then, for example, we would expect a decrease in the percentage of patients who were admitted to the ICU relative to less competitive markets.
To examine the impact of the number of firms on the different sets of outcomes in the cross section before and after the policy shift I use the following specification at the OPO/Month level:
Here firm count is the number of distinct centers active during the two-year sample period in a given OPO. While the count of the number of firms in an OPO is a crude measure of There are further worries about specification (2) that could pollute the validity of the regressions. First, if there are different trends in the movement of the outcome variable of interest at the OPO level that could lead to an omitted variables bias. While the month fixed effects absorb the common changes over time to the entire system, they do little to address changes at the OPO level. While it would be ideal to add OPO specific month effects, this would absorb all of the variation to observe the parameter of interest β 3 . One compromise is to allow for quadratic trends at the OPO level. I create a quadratic term for months centered at zero for March 2002 and going backwards and forwards one unit for each month difference. Though this imposes a quadratic structure on the trends, it is much less restrictive than not allowing for any OPO specific time changes. In other specifications I interact the variable sick ratio with the OPO fixed effects. The intention of this strategy is to estimate the β 3 parameter while flexibly controlling OPO specific changes in the level of scarcity.
As a robustness test I include a specification that interacts MELD era and region 23 to further allow for flexible time effects across geographically connected OPOs. All of the results are estimated using clustering at the OPO level. This addresses the problem of serial correlation without which the regression would assume that each observation is independent.
7. Results
Summary Statistics
In Figure 3 the average MELD score at transplant is computed on a monthly basis. It is difficult to determine whether there is a discontinuous jump in the average sickness at transplant, but it is clear that sickness of patients at transplant is increasing over time. Table 1 
about here>>
Prior to the policy change the average MELD score was 18.3 and after the policy shifts the average MELD score was 20.0. While the average sickness of patients at transplant was increasing over time Figure 4 shows that there was a large discontinuous drop in ICU admissions. Intuitively one would think the opposite: as patients are getting sick they should appear in the ICU more on average. Strategic manipulation of the allocation process leads to the opposite conclusion, when the incentive to place a patient in the ICU decreases the usage of the ICU decreases overall. This occurs despite the fact that patients are getting sicker over time.
<<COMP: Place Table 2 about here>>
In Table 2 the market structure of the 50 OPOs is described. 46% of the OPOs had only one transplant center while 20% of the OPOs had more than 3 centers. This variation in the market structure over the two-year sample period makes for an ideal sample to study the effects of increased competition on strategic manipulation. Tables 3a & 3b show that the difference in differences approach is seen in the unconditional data. Table 4 presents the basic results on the percentage of transplanted patients who come from the ICU. The results are consistent with hypothesis 1. In column (1) the cross sectional results from the year before the policy shift shows a strong association between the number of firms in an OPO and the percentage of transplanted patients coming from the ICU. Column (2) shows the same regression for the year following the policy shift. The impact of the number of firms in an OPO has decreased and is no longer significant.
<<COMP: Place
Columns (3)- (6) show a variety of specifications estimating whether the difference between the firm count parameters in column (1) and (2) are significant. Column (3) presents the most basic difference in differences specification to test the significance of the difference between the parameter estimates of firm count in columns (1) & (2). The parameter estimate of the interaction between MELD era and firm count suggest that for each additional firm 3.6% less of the patients are in the ICU at transplant after the MELD policy shift. Taken together with Figure 4 this shows that the fall in the use of the ICU was most dramatic in areas with the strongest competition, implying that competition was a strong driver of strategic manipulation. The specifications in (4)- (7) address the various threats to identification that revolve around OPO specific time trends or omitted variables bias due to differences in the underlying degree of in scarcity. The parameter estimate on the interaction between firm count and MELD era is quite stable across specifications and is always highly significant.
Hypothesis 2 test
<<COMP: Place Table 5 about here>> Do more firms in an OPO lead to relatively healthier people being admitted and transplanted from the ICU? To operationalize this point I look at the MELD scores of patients who were in the ICU at the time of transplant. In Table 5 columns (1) suggests that prior to the MELD reforms the MELD scores of patients coming from the ICU were lower in the more competitive areas. After the reform the result reverses itself. The results from the difference in differences specifications in columns (3) & (4) conform to this intuition. I
find that the inclusion of OPO control variables in columns (5) & (6) does not materially change the parameter estimates but reduces the significance of the estimates. Given the conservative clustering and the fact that some of the variables are such as OPO volume are co-linear with the number of firms in an OPO this is not surprising. In specification (7) I find that including interactions for region fixed effects and post MELD era reforms again yields significant results while the control variables are included. By including interactions between region and MELD era in this specification I restrict the comparison across different firm counts to other OPOs within the region. It is reasonable to assume that geographically closer entities would make better control groups. Although the evidence is not perfect, it seems to point towards an association between the number of firms in an OPO and a post-MELD decrease in the likelihood that a relatively healthy person will be put in the ICU.
Implications for the allocation of livers
<<COMP: Place Table 6 about here>> Table 6 
Robustness tests
<<COMP: Place Table 7 about here>>
In table 7 I show that relaxing the assumption of a linear structure on the firm count variable does not substantially change the results from tables 4 -6. In columns (1) - (3) I create a fixed effects for all possible numbers of centers in an OPO and regress it on all three of the prior outcomes. 25 In columns (4) - (6) I perform a similar analysis using specification (4) from tables 4 -6. I find that this relaxed functional form is consistent with the prior results.
Finally in unreported results 26 I find that organ acceptance policies do not change after the MELD policy. Using age of the donor 27 as a proxy for organ quality I find no effect on the interaction between firm count and MELD era using specifications similar to tables 4 -6. This issue is of concern since marginal organs often go to very sick patients. If after the MELD era OPOs with more firms became less likely to accept marginal organs then transplants from the ICU would also go down. The evidence is not consistent with this explanation.
Conclusions
This paper shows that the number of firms in the OPO appears to be robustly associated with increases in strategic behavior in the liver transplant market prior to the MELD reforms. The findings suggest that when centers are faced with opportunities to reallocate livers from the patients of other centers to their own patients, these opportunities were taken. I found that prior to the reforms competition encouraged centers to use the ICU more often for patients that were relatively healthy. There was little evidence to suggest that this distorted the level of sickness of patients at transplant. This suggests that centers used the ICU to make sure that their sickest patients maintained a high priority on the waiting list.
The aggressive use of the ICU in OPOs with many firms did not seem to significantly distort away from the intended policy of prioritizing the sickest patients first for a liver transplant.
One important issue to note is that these estimates should not be interpreted as a causal relationship between competition and ethical behavior. Although the policy change enables me to observe a change in gaming behavior I do not have a good instrument for competition across OPOs. While it is likely that many exogenous factors shaped the current market structure, it is difficult to isolate these factors in the form of an instrument.
Another issue to note is that there is considerable ambiguity in the welfare implications of the gaming of the liver list. Strategically manipulating the list for the benefit of a relatively healthy patient at the expense of a relatively sick one could be welfare
improving. An anecdotal observation among transplant surgeons is that patients often stay at their level of activity prior to transplant. So if a patient was not working prior to transplant, anecdotally they don't return to work. By providing a liver to a patient sooner rather than later the patient's benefit from the organ could be larger. However, if the sole purpose of strategically manipulating the list was to get healthier patients livers then we
should not see such a strong association between the number of firms and gaming behavior.
Examining these broader ethical issues of strategic manipulation is interesting but is beyond the capabilities of this paper.
Further work is needed to assess how general these results are. In principle similar findings to those in this paper might be present where it is possible to strategically misrepresent some characteristic to gain access to a scarce resource. 3 There is an exceptionally large literature on ethics in business which is beyond the scope of this paper. See (Ford and Richardson, 1994) , (Loe et. al., 2000) , and (Trevino, et. al., 2006) . 4 This is part of the more general argument that ethical behavior is endogenous to social circumstances. For example see (Milgram 1963; Trevino et. al., 2006) . Scalet (2006) provides an intriguing argument that it might not always be optimal to design institutions to solve ethical induced by competition.
5 Examples from this literature include (Hsieh and Moretti, 2003; Berry and Waldfogel, 1999; Davis 2006) 6 Vaughn (1983) provides a detailed case study on Medicare fraud that is related to this empirical literature.
7 There is a literature on how hospital competition influences other outcomes (health, costs, etc.) . See (Dranove et. al., 1992; Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Kessler and Geppert, 2005 ).
8 Figure 2 shows a map that illustrates the distribution of centers and OPOs.
9 These 11 regions were chosen by UNOS. This differs from the standard convention of 4 regions in the United States. These numbers only vary minimally before and after the MELD policy change.
After the policy change the probability a liver is shared outside the OPO increases by about 1.5% 10 The definition of what constitutes a severely sick patient is given in section VI.
11 (Trotter and Osgood, 2004 ) also show that there are large cross sectional differences in liver scarcity across OPOs.
12 Currently in kidney transplants there is a substantial debate over changing the kidney allocation scheme to one based on net lifetime benefit, where kidneys go to those who would benefit the most from them 13 See the Institute of Medicine's 1999 report for a detailed discussion of the allocation prior to the policy change. In the interest of space I am only able to give a very brief overview.
14 This aggregation was called the Child-Turcotte-Pugh (CTP) scoring system. 15 Unfortunately prior research has shown that time on the waiting list was a poor predictor of patient health Freeman (2000) . 16 In response it is widely believed that most centers gave almost everyone a high score. The data to confirm this observation unfortunately does not exist.
17 Also see Transplant News 11/30/2003 18 For more details on the policy change and some of its direct effects see (Freeman, 2003; Freeman et al., 2002; Trotter and Osgood, 2004; Wiesner et al., 2003) 19 Ocassionally one component of the MELD score was missing. To make all of the MELD scores comparable across individuals that component was interpolated.
20 Using top 25 nephrology programs yields similar results. 21 This measure was constructed from the average characteristics of each person added to the wait list from January 1st, 2000 to December 31st, 2002. 22 The demographic characteristics and the center rankings. 23 Recall that region is a United Network for Organ Sharing designation for eleven distinct parts of the country.
Snyder 27 24 A .66 point increase in a MELD score is approximately equal to a .3% increase in expected one year survival. This comes from a calculation performed by the author.
25 I use specification (3) from tables 4 -6. 26 Results available upon request. 27 While age is not a perfect proxy for organ quality it is one of the proxies that is uniformly collected and easily observable. This is an important measure of quality in Howard (2002) . Table 3b : Difference in differences impact of MELD reforms and competition on the MELD scores of patients in the ICU Note: Data is at the OPO month level. * significant at 10% confidence level, ** significant at 5% confidence level, *** significant at 1% confidence level. 
